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Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: the
Efficiency Effect of Taxes, Transfers
and Fiscal Illusion1
Julio López-Laborda* and Antoni Zabalza**
*Department of Public Economics, University of Zaragoza
** Department of Economic Analysis, University of Valencia

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency cost of transfers.
To this end, we develop a model of individual demand decisions about the provision of
a regional public good that encompasses a continuum of tax/transfers scenarios to
finance regional public expenditure. We assume that individuals have identical quasilinear preferences defined over private consumption and the regional public good, that
endowment income varies between individuals and regions and that regions have
different predetermined sizes. We show that, despite its simplicity, this model is capable
of discriminating the efficiency properties of the different scenarios considered, and that
the substitution of transfers for own regional taxes always raises the provision of the
regional public good. Our model yields the so called “flypaper effect” with no need to
appeal to the existence of “fiscal illusion” by the part of the individual. We nevertheless
find that “fiscal illusion” increases the elasticity of public good provision with respect to
transfers, and we suggest two potentially refutable hypotheses to identify the existence
of this phenomenon.
KEYWORDS: Regional finance, taxes, transfers, fiscal illusion, flypaper effect.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: H7
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1. Introduction
Arguably, one of the most important problems regarding the design of federal
systems is the allocation of revenue sources among different levels of government, so
that expenditure responsibilities can be adequately financed. Theoretical alternatives
range from the attribution to each jurisdiction of its own taxes, to the attribution of all
taxes to the central jurisdiction together with the implementation of transfers to finance
subcentral levels of government (henceforth “regions”). In practice, no federal country
applies any of these two pure models. Normally, own regional taxes play a
predominant, but not exclusive role. They tend to be complemented by central
government transfers aimed at diverse objectives, such as the compensation of
horizontal and vertical fiscal gaps, the correction of externalities, the promotion of
regional development and the imposition of national minimum standards in the
provision of particular regional services.2
The literature on fiscal federalism has dealt extensively with this subject. The
identification of taxes that are susceptible of being decentralized is a recurrent topic
since the seminal contribution by Musgrave (1983).3 Also, the work by Gordon (1983)
opened an extensive literature on the consequences of the use of distortionary taxes by
regional governments, among which we find the emergence of fiscal externalities, both
horizontal (tax exporting and fiscal competition between regions) and vertical (due to
the sharing of tax bases by the central and regional levels of government).4 The other
main area of growing interest is the typology, purpose and economic effects of
intergovernmental transfers, with particular attention to equalizing grants and to the
flypaper effect.5
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency cost of transfers. This is a
modest endeavour compared with the contributions cited above, but nevertheless a
necessary task that, in a sense, deals with a question previous to the issues considered
above. There is a wide agreement in the literature on the prevalence of taxes over
2

See Shah, ed. (2007) and Boadway (2012).

3

For a recent discussion of the tax assignment problem see Boadway and Shah (2009).

4

Recent treatments of these topics can be found in Wilson (2006), Dahlby (2008, ch. 9) and Boadway and
Shah (2009).
5

Buchanan (1950) and Musgrave (1961) are the two seminal contributions on equalising transfers.
Boadway and Shah (2009) offer a complete analysis of the theory and practice of interjurisdictional
transfers. We return to the flypaper effect below in this work.
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transfers among the instruments of regional finance. The standard political argument is
that own taxes make it possible the fiscal autonomy of regions and, from an economic
point of view, it is argued that taxes force regional governments to be fiscally
accountable before its electors, a circumstance that favours the efficient provision of
public goods and services.6 Transfer finance, on the other hand, weakens fiscal
autonomy and accountability and leads to wrong decisions concerning public
expenditure. Our objective in this paper is to formalize this argument in a systematic
manner and to identify the efficiency gains associated with own regional taxes with
regard to other formulas, such as all transfer or mixed tax/transfer methods of regional
finance. As far as we know, this has not been done before.
To this end, we develop a model based on individual demand decisions concerning
the level of the regional public good, where individuals have identical quasi-linear
preferences defined over private consumption and a regional public good, and where
only endowment income varies between individuals and regions. Regions, on the other
hand, have different predetermined sizes. This is admittedly a very simple model, but
we show that it is sufficient to make the efficiency properties of the several scenarios
considered visible. This is done in the context of non distortionary taxation, but we
argue as well that the results obtained are very likely to hold in an economy in which
taxes impose an efficiency cost. If the “flypaper effect” is defined as the increase in
public good provision as the result of substituting transfers for own regional taxes, then
our model yields this effect with no need to appeal to the existence of “fiscal illusion”
by the part of the individual. We nevertheless find that “fiscal illusion” increases the
elasticity of public good provision with respect to transfers, and we suggest two
potentially refutable hypotheses to empirically identify the existence of this
phenomenon.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we identify the reference point that
will be used all along the paper: the Pareto efficient provision of the regional public
good. In Section 3 we develop a model that generates a continuum of tax/transfer mix
scenarios and use this framework to analyse their efficiency under the collective
decision rule of simple majority. In this model, the transfer is a given fraction of the
cost of the public good. This section is complemented with an Annex in which we
extend the results of Section 3 to an economy with distortionary taxation. In Section 4
6

Here, again, the literature is huge. See, for all, Bird (1993).
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we consider a variant of the tax/transfer mix, in which the transfer is independent of the
level of provision of the public good. We show that when an exogenous transfer is used
along with marginal taxation by regions, and under certain restrictions, these two
sources of revenue are interchangeable and Pareto efficiency is achieved. In Section 5
we review other scenarios of interest ―tax revenue sharing and tax sharing
complemented with own regional taxes― and show that they can be assimilated to
some of the basic scenarios considered in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 6 we define the
concept of “fiscal illusion” and apply it to the different scenarios identified in the paper.
We show that fiscal illusion does not have an effect in all circumstances, but that there
are certain scenarios in which a flypaper-type effect arises; in this respect we identify
two hypotheses which are empirically testable. Section 7 ends the paper with some
concluding remarks and a summary of the main results obtained.

2. Pareto efficient equilibrium
Let us consider, as in Persson and Tabellini (2000), a country formed by J regions,
each with N j individuals. The country’s population is N, where N   j N j . Individual
i of region j has the following quasi-linear utility function

wij  cij  H  g j  ,

(1)

where cij is his consumption of private goods and H   an increasing concave function
defined over a regionally provided public good with no inter-region spillovers g j .7 All
individuals have the same preferences. In all regions, a unit of income can be
transformed without cost into a unit of the public good. If we denote the cost of the
public good by c  g j  , then c  g j   g j , so the marginal cost of providing the public
good is dc  g j  dg j  1. There is no mobility between jurisdictions and the central

7

The same results we obtain in this paper would follow if instead we considered a publicly provided
private good.
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government provides a national public good g c that is financed with a lump sum central
tax paid by the total country’s population.8
To obtain the efficient level of provision of g j , the regional government maximizes
the sum of utilities of region j’s inhabitants with respect to g j

Max W j   wij   cij  N j H  g j ,
gj

i

i

subject to the resource constraint:

g j   cij   yij ,
i

i

where yij is the individual’s endowment income, mij , net of the lump sum central tax.
That is, yij  mij   gc N  . Since our interest is on the level of provision of the regional
public good, in what follows we take the tax gc N as given and work directly with yij .
Substituting the resource constraint into W j , the expression to be maximized is

W j   yij  g j  N j H  g j ,
i

and the first order condition is

dW j
dg j

 1  N j H g  g j   0,

or

N j H g  g j   1,

j.

(2)

At the efficient level of provision, g j , the sum over all J inhabitants of the marginal
rates of substitution between the public good and private consumption will equal the
marginal cost. This is the Samuelson (1954) condition and constitutes the reference
position that we shall use in this exercise to evaluate the different tax/transfer structures
under consideration.

8

The existence of a national public good is not crucial to our argument, and could perfectly well be
ignored, assuming that the only central government responsibility is to raise national taxes in order to
fund transfers to the regions.
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Notice that with quasi-linear preferences the efficient amount of the public good is

independent of the level of private consumption. This is readily seen in (2), which
determines a unique level of g j with independence from the optimal level of cij .
Another implication of this assumption is that income effects are zero as far as the
efficient amount of the public good is concerned.
Can this social optimum be obtained as the result of individual behaviour and
majority rule? In what follows, we explore this question using the simple model
developed above and in the context of several alternative ways of financing the regional
public good.

3. A model of the tax/transfer mix
3.1. Lump sum tax finance
Suppose that in general regional governments finance their public expenditure by
means of own taxes and transfers from the central government. In this section we
consider that only lump-sum taxation is available to both levels of government in order
to collect their own taxes or to fund transfers. Transfers from the central government are
a compensatory mechanism to help regional governments to pay for their expenditure;
that is
s j   g j , j,

(3)

where  is the fraction of the cost of the regional public good that is covered by the
transfer, 0    1.9
With lump-sum finance, the budget constraint faced by individual i of region j is

cij  yij 

s g j  sj

,
N
Nj

Where s is the total transfer and s N the lump-sum tax that the central government
collects from all national residents in order to fund this transfer. Given this transfer, the
regional government finances the uncovered cost of the public good by means of a
9

At this level of generality, transfers can be thought of as open-ended and, given  , dependent on the

optimal level of g j . Mathematically, the parameter  is a shift parameter that measures the relative
importance of transfers in the regional finance system.
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lump-sum tax  g j  s j  N j levied on the residents of the region. Using (3), this budget
constraint can be rewritten as

gj
g
 1   
,
N
Nj

cij  yij  
where g   j g j , or

cij  yij 



g
N
k j

k

 1
1 
   1     g j .
N j 
 N

(4)

Expression (4) tells us that, in general, the budget constraint faced by the individual has,
in the  cij , g j  space, a vertical intercept equal to
yij 


N

g ,
k j

k

and a constant slope, the absolute value of which is



1
1
 1   
.
N
Nj

This framework allows us to identify the following three finance scenarios.

Own regional tax scenario
If   0 ―that is, there is no transfer and the region finances its public good by
means of a lump-sum tax levied on its residents― then (4) gets reduced to

cij  yij 

gj
Nj

,

(5)

which is the steepest budget line of Figure 1, with vertical intercept yij and slope
(absolute value) 1 N j .10
Substituting (5) into the individual’s utility function (1), we have

10

Unless indicated otherwise, in what follows slopes are always measured by means of their absolute
value.
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wij  yij 

gj
Nj

 H  g j .

His demand for the public good will satisfy the first order condition

dwij
dg j



1
 H g  g tj   0,
Nj

or

N j H g  g tj   1, j,

(6)

where g tj is the level of provision of the regional public good demanded by individuals
when this good is financed with a regional lump sum tax.

Figure 1: Tax/transfer mix equilibriums

cij
1 Nj



yij
yij 
yij 


N

g

1
N

g

k j

k j

k

1
1
 1   
N
Nj

A

k

1N

B

C

gj
g j  g tj

g tsj g sj
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Comparing (2) and (6) we conclude that g tj  g j . The social optimum emerges as an
equilibrium if the public good is financed with a regional lump sum tax.11 See also that
this is the demand of all individuals in region J. Under the assumption of identical quasi
linear preferences there is unanimity concerning the demand of the public good, which
in Figure 1 is represented by point A.

Transfer scenario
If   1 ―that is, the regional government obtains all the finance needed through a
transfer from the central government― then (4) gets reduced to

cij  yij 

g
1
gk  j ,

N k j
N

which is the flattest budget line in Figure 1, with vertical intercept yij 



k j

gk N



and slope 1 N . In this case, the individual’s indirect utility is

wij  yij 

g
1
gk  j  H  g j  ,

N k j
N

and the level of provision of the public good, g sj , must satisfy the first order condition

dwij
dg j



1
 H g  g sj   0,
N

or
H g ( g sj ) 

1
.
N

Multiplying both sides of this expression by N j we have
N j H g ( g sj ) 

11

Nj
N

, j,

See Bowen (1943), Casahuga (1982), and Brennan and Buchanan (1983).

(7)
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and comparing (2) and (7) it follows that g sj  g j , j , since N j N  1. All regions over
provide the regional public good in comparison with the Pareto efficient level. This is
point C in Figure 1.
We have here the familiar common-pool problem:12 each region internalizes the
whole of the benefits generated by its own public good, but, as finance is shared with
other regions, it only internalizes a fraction N j N of the marginal cost. Transfer
finance, therefore, generates financial irresponsibility by the part of the region, while
keeping its autonomy in deciding the level at which the public good must be provided.
Tax/transfer mix scenario
Finally, if 0    1 ―that is, if regional finance is obtained by a mix between own
tax and transfer from the central government― then the relevant budget constraint is the
same expression (4). The tax-price of the public good faced by the individual is a
weighted average of the tax-price associated to the all transfer scenario, 1 N , and that
associated to the own tax scenario, 1 N j , where the weighting factor is the transfer
coverage parameter  . This is the middle budget line of Figure 1, with vertical intercept

yij  



k j



gk N and slope  1 N   1    1 N j  .

Substituting (4) into the individual’s utility function we have

wij  yij 



g
N
k j

k

 1
1 
   1     g j  H  g j  ,
N j 
 N

with first order condition
H g  g tsj   

1
1
 1   
,
N
Nj

or

 Nj 
N j H g  g tsj   1   1 
 , j.
N 


(8)

This is equilibrium B in Figure 1. If transfers have an element of compensation
linked to the provision of the regional public good, their introduction into the system,

12

The so called “1/N law”. See Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981).
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even if they are complemented with taxes, will generate a distortion in the tax-price, and
generate an over provision, of the public good. The distortion, and therefore the over
provision, will be larger the more important is the transfer in relation to the cost of the
public good; that is, the larger is the parameter  . Thus, as Figure 1 shows,
g j  g tj  g tsj  g sj .13

See also that in this model tax and transfer are not interchangeable. The more
important transfers are as substitutes for own regional tax, the greater is the divergence
of the public good tax-price from the level that would generate the efficient solution at
point A.

3.2. Proportional income tax finance
The same results follow if all the revenue from the private sector has to be obtained
with a proportional income tax. Then, the individual’s budget constraint is

cij  yij 



yij
y

s

yij
yj

g

j

 sj ,



where y j   yij and y   y j . yij y s is the individual’s tax liability to the central
i

j

government to fund the transfer, and  yij y j  g j  s j  the individual’s liability to the
regional government to finance the part of the public good cost not covered by the
transfer.
Using (3), the budget constraint can be rewritten as


g  yij
cij  yij 1     1    g j ,
y  yj

or

13

In equilibriums B and C, ―that is, whenever there are transfers― at the regional and individual levels,
income effects may appear. Exclusively in order to provide an unencumbered presentation, in Figure 1 we
rule out these income effects, which is equivalent to assuming that g j g  N j N when finance is lumpsum, and g j g  y j y when it is proportional to income. This allows us to draw equilibriums B and C on
the steepest budget line. In both cases, however, and even if the above proportionality results do not hold,
the resource constraint is fulfilled, as it should be, at the economy wide level. In the case of own regional
taxation, the resource constraint is always fulfilled: not only at the economy wide level, but also at the
regional and individual levels.
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cij  yij 1  



g
k j

y

k


yij 
  yij
   y  1    y  g j .

j 
 


(9)

Expression (9) is the equivalent of expression (4) when the only available tax is
proportional to income, and the three scenarios follow from the corresponding values of

.

Own regional tax scenario
If   0 , the individual’s budget constraint (9) gets reduced to

 gj
cij  yij 1 

yj



 .


The public good is financed by the regional government applying a constant rate g j y j
to individual income yij . In terms of Figure 1, this would be the steepest budget line,
with vertical intercept yij and slope yij y j .
Thus, individual preferences are given by

 gj
wij  1 

yj



 yij  H  g j  ,


and the level of provision of the public good that maximizes individual utility satisfies
the following first order condition:

dwij
dg j



yij
yj

 H g  g j   0,

or

Hg  g j  

yij
yj

.
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Under majority rule, the equilibrium level of provision of the public good will be
determined by the preferences of the voter with median income, ymj . That is,

H g  g tj  

ymj
yj

.

If yij is symmetrically distributed so that ymj  y j , where y j is the regional mean
income, the equilibrium level of provision is also

yj
H g  g tj  

Nj
yj



1
,
Nj

or

N j H g  g tj   1, j.

(10)

If, as assumed, mean income equals median income, the equilibrium level of provision
of the public good financed with a regional proportional income tax will be the same as
the social optimum level defined in (2). That is, g tj  g *j .
This corresponds to point A of Figure 1, although the figure now would only
represent the median voter. The vertical intercept of the steepest budget line would now
be ymj , and the slope ymj y j , which under the assumption that ymj  y equals 1 N j .

Transfer scenario
If   1 , expression (9) reduces to

  gk

cij  yij 1  k  j
y




 yij
  y g j.



Individual i’s preferences are now

  gk

wij  yij 1  k  j
y


with first order condition


 yij
  y g j  H  g j ,
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dwij
dg j



yij
y

 H g  g j   0,

or
yij

Hg  g j  

y

.

In this case, the decisive voter is that with the median level of income over the
region. That is,
ymj

H g  g sj  

y

.

If median income is equal to mean income, ymj  y j , the equilibrium level of provision
is

yj
H g  g sj  

Nj
y



yj 1
,
y Nj

or
N j H g  g sj  

yj
y

 1, j.

(11)

Comparing (2) and (11) it follows that g sj  g j , j . Regions over provide the regional
public good.
If for region J median income is equal to the country wide average income, ymj  y ,
the equilibrium level of public good individually demanded is given by
y
1
H g  g sj   N  .
y N

Multiplying both sides of the equation by N j , this condition can be rewritten as
N j H g ( g sj ) 

Nj
N

,

j.

(12)
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Since N j N  1, region j over provides the regional public good: g sj  g j , j . See also
that expressions (7) and (12) coincide. Thus, if ymj  y , the equilibrium regional policy
will be independent of the type of tax used to fund the transfer; if ymj  y the
equilibrium provision of the public good will be larger when the transfer is funded with
a proportional income tax than when it is funded with a lump-sum tax, and vice versa
when ymj  y .
In terms of Figure 1, equilibrium (12) corresponds, as it was the case with lump-sum
finance, with point C, only that in this case it only applies to the median voter and the
parameters of the budget line are measured differently. The vertical intercept of the
flattest budget line would now be ymj 1 




k j



g k y  , and the slope ymj y , which


under the assumption that ymj  y is, as in Figure 1, equal to 1 N .

Tax/transfer mix scenario
If 0    1, the individual’s budget constraint is the same expression (9) and, in this
case, the indirect utility function is



wij  yij 1  



g
k j

y

k


yij 
  yij



1





 g j  H  g j ,

y j 
  y


with first order condition

Hg  g j   

yij
y

 1   

yij
yj

.

In this case, the decisive voter that generates the equilibrium condition is

Hg  g j   

ymj
y

 1   

ymj
yj

.

If within the region median and average income are equal, ymj  y j , the equilibrium
level of provision is

16
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H g  g tsj   

yj 1
1
 1   
,
y Nj
Nj

or

 yj 
N j H g  g tsj   1   1   , j.
y


(13)

Since  y j y   1 , condition (13) equates the social marginal benefit to a social marginal
cost which is less than 1, thereby generating an over provision of the regional public
good. Further, if ymj  y j  y , the equilibrium level of the public good is
H g  g tsj   

1
1
 1   
,
N
Nj

or

 Nj
N j H g  g tsj   1   1 
N



 , j,


(14)

which is the same as condition (8). Thus, if ymj  y j  y , the equilibrium provision of
the public good will be independent of the type of tax used to fund the transfer; if
ymj  y the equilibrium provision will be larger when the transfer is funded with a

proportional income tax than when it is funded with a lump-sum tax, and vice versa
when ymj  y .
Figure 1 can also handle this equilibrium at point B, only that now the middle
budget line would have a vertical intercept equal to ymj 1  




k j



gk y  , and a slope


equal to   ymj y   1     ymj y j  , which under the assumptions held about the
distribution of income reduces to  1 N   1    1 N j  , exactly the same as that
depicted in Figure 1.

3.3. Summary of results
Figure 2 shows, in the demand/supply space, the level of provision of the regional
public good of each scenario. The reference case is the Pareto efficient equilibrium,
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where the regional public good, g j , is provided up to the point where aggregate
demand, the sum over all regional residents of the marginal rates of substitution
between the public good and private consumption ―we call this concept the sum of
marginal benefits,
provision,

 MC
i

i

 MB
i

ij

― equals aggregate supply, the total marginal cost of

, which under the assumptions of our model is equal to 1.

The equilibrium level of provision coincides with the Pareto efficient equilibrium in
the case of own regional tax finance, g tj ―conditions (6) and (10). There is however
over provision in the case of the tax/transfer mix scenario, g tsj ―conditions (8) and
(14)― and in the transfer scenario, g sj ―conditions (7) and (12). Also, the degree of
over provision increases as we go from the own tax scenario to the transfer scenario.
Given that  N j N   1 , it must be the case that g j  g tj  g tsj  g sj .14

Figure 2: Comparison of alternative regional finance scenarios

14

The results of Section 3 are all obtained under the assumption of non distortionary taxation. It is
therefore pertinent to ask to what extent they would change should the recourse to this type of taxes be
not available. This opens a wide area of analysis (see for instance Dahlby, 2008) which would take us far
away from the purpose of this article. We nevertheless present in the Annex to this work a simple
extension of the tax/transfer mix model used here that takes into account the efficiency cost of taxation.
Using a representative individual assumption, and therefore abstracting from distributional
considerations, we show that the qualitative results obtained above are maintained when taxes affect
negatively the level of individual income.
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4. Exogenous transfer finance
Notice that in the above model, the transfer is defined as a given fraction  of the
equilibrium provision level of the regional public good. If the transfer is assumed to be
completely independent of the level of provision of the regional public good, then
results are quite different from those obtained in the mix tax/transfer scenario of Section
3. In particular, the determining element is then again the marginal own tax and, under
certain conditions, full Pareto efficient results are obtained.
Both models capture some elements of reality, and both are abstractions that miss
particular features of actual finance systems. For instance, in the model of Section 3 we
have assumed that the parameter  is the same for all regions, while a regional specific
parameter may be more realistic. On the other hand, the complete exogeneity of the
transfer is difficult to defend in the light of the equalising nature that these transfers use
to present in real finance systems. In any case, and for the purpose of completeness, we
develop in this section a tax/transfer scenario with the transfer exogenously determined.
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Consider a system in which the exogenously determined fixed transfer to region j,
s j , does not cover the whole of the cost of the public good. That is, s j  g j .15 As in

Section 3, we consider both lump-sum and proportional income taxation to finance this
transfer and the rest of the public expenditure.

4.1. Lump-sum taxation
Suppose that to finance all the s j 's transfers the central government collects from
the whole country’s population a lump sum tax equal to 1 N  s , where s   j s j .
Since s j  g j , j , region j additionally collects a lump-sum tax to finance the
uncovered part of the cost of the public good equal to 1 N j  g j  s j  . The individual’s
preferences are now:
wij  yij 

1
1
s
 g j  sj   H  g j ,
N
Nj

and the demanded level of public good will satisfy the first order condition

dwij
dg j



1
 H g  g j   0,
Nj

or



N j H g g j

t es

  1,

(15)

where g tj e  s is the equilibrium level of provision of the public good when the
exogenous transfer is complemented in the margin with own regional taxation. This
structure of finance, therefore, does effectively generate the provision of the efficient
level of the public good, g tj es  g j .
However, despite the fact that expression (15) is the same as expression (6), the
present tax/transfer equilibrium is not in general the same as that discussed in Section 3.
The individual’s budget constraint in this case is

15

In principle, s j could be greater than g j , but then the regional tax would be negative. That is, the

regional government would give a hand out to the residents of that region.
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 s sj  1
cij  yij   

g.
 N N  N j
j
j



(16)

That is, the tax/transfer scenario leaves the tax-price of the public good unchanged, but
introduces in general an income effect, the sign of which, as Figure 3 shows, depends
on how the transfer is distributed among regions. This circumstance has no effect on the
demand of the public good if, as is the case in our model, preferences are quasi-linear.
With this utility function, the income effect on the public good is zero, all pure
variations in income being absorbed by the consumption of the private good. But for a
more general utility function, a pure variation in income would change the consumption
of both private and public goods.
Figure 3: Tax/(exogenous) transfer mix and quasi-linear preferences

cij

yij

1 Nj

gj

j

g g g
t
j

t  e s
j

N j yij

This raises some interesting questions regarding both the design of the transfer
system and the equivalence between the tax and the tax/transfer scenarios. Even if
preferences are quasi-linear, the equivalence between the tax and tax/transfer
equilibriums will only refer to the provision of the public good, but not to the
consumption of the private good. If preferences are not quasi-linear, there will be no
equivalence in the consumption of either private or public good. Perfect equivalence
between the two scenarios only holds when the total transfer is distributed among
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regions according to relative population, s j   N j N  s . In that case, the income effect
disappears and the budget line of all regions is exactly the same as the one considered in
Section 3.1 for the own regional tax scenario; that is, the continuous budget line of
Figure 3. If the total transfer is not distributed according to relative population, there
will be regions in which the income effect will be positive ―those for which

s j   N j N  , represented in the figure by the upper dotted budget line― and others in
which it ill be negative ―those for which s j   N j N  , represented by the lower
dotted budget line.

4.2. Proportional income taxation
Suppose now that both central and regional governments finance, respectively, the
transfer and the uncovered gap with a proportional income tax. Then the individual’s
indirect utility function is:

wij  yij 

yij
y

s

yij
yj

g

j

 s j   H  g j .

The first order condition is

dwij
dg j



yij
yj

 H g  g j   0,

or

Hg  g j  

yij
yj

,

and, under majority rule, if ymj  y j , the equilibrium level of provision of the public
good in this case is



N j H g g j

t es

  1, j.

(17)

Again the mix tax/transfer is efficient, g tj es  g j .
Figure 3 also represents this median voter equilibrium but then the vertical intercept
of the budget line is ymj 1   s y    s j y j  , and the slope ymj y j , which for the
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assumptions used above equals 1 N j . Now, the tax and tax/transfer scenarios are fully
equivalent when the transfer is distributed among regions according to relative income,

s j   y j y  s . Only in that case does the income effect cease to exist and for all regions
the relevant budget is the continuous line of Figure 3.

5. Other scenarios of interest
Sections 3 and 4 do not exhaust the possible scenarios of interest, although the
remaining ones can be shown to be identical to the alternatives that we have already
considered in this paper, albeit with some changes in nomenclature. Again for
completeness, we make in this section some brief considerations on these other
scenarios.

5.1. Tax revenue sharing
Sharing the revenue raised by a central tax in order to finance the provision of a
regional public good is the same as using transfer finance. Suppose the central
government collects a nation-wide proportional income tax to finance both its own
national public good and all the regional public goods. If region j shares on this revenue
so that its public good g j can be financed, the individual share cannot be other than

 y y  g . But this is equivalent to the case of a transfer financed with a proportional
ij

income tax, and therefore the demand of the regional public good must be (12). And the
same is true if instead of a proportional income tax, a lump sum tax is considered. Then
the individual share needed to finance the regional public good would be 1 N  g and
the demand for the public good would be given by (7), the one corresponding to a
transfer financed with a lump-sum tax.
Tax sharing has been advocated as a form of participation by regions in potentially
large tax bases, in which the central government has a larger comparative advantage in
efficient exploitation than regions. Apart from this, perhaps the only other advantage
that tax revenue share has over transfers is that individuals may be more aware of what
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it is that they are really financing with their taxes, and thus make more unlikely the
incidence of the phenomenon of fiscal illusion that we discuss below.16

5.2. Own taxes/shared taxes finance
The tax/transfer mix results are immediately applicable to a scenario in which own
taxes complement not an exogenous transfer from the central government, but an
exogenously fixed share of the central tax. It is easy to show that in this scenario the
Pareto efficient equilibrium can also be reached, whether taxes are lump-sum or
proportional to income.
This is a widely used structure in practice. For instance, the Spanish regional finance
system combines the three types of revenue considered in this paper. In addition to
transfers, Spanish autonomous communities have the revenue obtained from a set of
ceded taxes. Some of these are real own regional taxes in that autonomous communities
can decide, subject to certain restrictions, tax rates and some elements of the taxable
base; this is the case, for instance, of the personal income tax and the inheritance tax.
Other ceded figures fall squarely into the category of tax-sharing, as communities
receive the revenue raised in their territory but have no responsibility whatsoever in
establishing the corresponding tax liability: this is the case of VAT and excises.17

6. Fiscal illusion
Fiscal illusion has frequently been associated with the so called “flypaper effect”. If
this is defined as the increase in public good provision resulting from the substitution of
transfers for own regional taxes, then, as can be seen in Section 3, our model yields this
effect with no need to appeal to the existence of “fiscal illusion” by the part of the
individual. In our model, which is resource constrained, the equivalence Bradford and
16

Spanish experience on the effect of tax revenue sharing on the perception of regional taxpayers is not
very encouraging. Surveys systematically show that a significant percentage of people is not capable of
correctly identifying the level of government responsible for major taxes and public services. See, for
instance, Área de Sociología Tributaria (2011) and López-Laborda and Rodrigo (2012).
17

See Zabalza and López-Laborda (2011).
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Oates (1971) result does not apply: transfers and own regional taxes are not
interchangeable as far as their effect on the demand of the public good. We nevertheless
think that in federal finance “fiscal illusion” may play a role important enough to merit
attention, and therefore consider in this section what the consequences of this
phenomenon would be for the three scenarios contemplated in Section 3. 18

6.1. Tax/transfer mix scenarios with fiscal illusion
The continuum of scenarios examined above assumes a high level of fiscal
perception by the part of the individual. Among the taxes paid to the central
government, one is able to differentiate between that levied to fund the transfer to the
regions and that levied to finance the national public good. This, however, may no be
the case. The individual may suffer from “fiscal illusion” and fail to distinguish between
the two types of tax paid to the central government and, therefore, fail as well to see the
link between any of these taxes and the level of public good.
If   0 , there is no possibility of confusion as the individual pays only one tax to
the central government; namely, concentrating our explanation only on lump-sum tax
case,19 the tax destined to finance the national public good gc N , which is already
incorporated in the term yij . The other tax paid, g j N j , is collected by the regional
government, and thus, according to our definition of fiscal illusion, does not generate
any misperception. The budget constraint is still limited by the steeper line in Figure 1
and therefore nothing changes as far as the equilibrium is concerned. In terms of our
model, the own taxation scenario is not compatible with fiscal illusion.
If 0    1, the overall tax revenue collected from the individual by the central
government is composed of that coming from the tax destined to finance the national

18

The “flypaper effect” is defined as the differential effect that transfers have on regional public good
provision as compared with the response elicited by increases in disposable income. According to Hines
and Thaler (1995), Arthur Okun coined the label because the money that the central government sends to
the regions “sticks where it hits”. The first pieces of empirical evidence on the existence of the flypaper
effect are due to Henderson (1968) and Gramlich (1969). For a review of the wide theoretical and
empirical literature on this effect see Bailey (1999, ch. 11) and Gamkhar and Shah (2007). As Hines and
Thaler (1995) point out in their survey, there have been two general strands of enquiry to explain this
effect. One is based on the behavior of bureaucrats interested in maximizing the size of their department’s
budget, and the other on the existence of some sort of misperception (“fiscal illusion”) by the part of
individuals.
19

The effect of fiscal illusion is the same whether we consider lump-sum or income proportional taxation.
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public good, gc N plus that coming from the tax destined to finance the transfer to the
regions, 

  g N  . Thus the budget constraint that the individual perceives is
j

j

cij  yij 

1 
gj,
Nj

where

yij  mij 


1
 gc    g j  .
N
j


The individual obviously knows what the amount of tax exacted from him by the



central government is, namely 1 N   gc    g j  , but because of fiscal illusion, he
j


cannot distinguish between g c and   g j , nor therefore see the link between the
j

regional public good and the compensatory transfer received by the regional
government. The whole of yij is thus perceived as an exogenous variable unrelated to
the provision of the regional public good, and the first order condition that the
demanded level of the regional good, g tsj  fi  , will have to satisfy is

dwij
dg j



1     H
Nj

g

 g     0,
ts fi
j

or



N j Hg g j 

ts fi 

  1   , j.

(18)

The perceived social marginal cost is less with than without fiscal illusion as

 N 
1    1   1  j  .
N 

Therefore, fiscal illusion worsens the distortion of compensatory transfers and thus the
over provision of the regional public good: g tsj  fi   g tsj .20

20

Oates (1979) advances a model of “fiscal illusion” that is closely related to the one presented here but
not identical. First, he adopts a partial equilibrium approach because he ignores the funding of the central
government transfer. Second, Oates’ particular definition of fiscal illusion involves individuals confusing
the average and marginal tax-price of the public good. Our definition, on the other hand, relies only on the
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Finally, if   1 , the possibility of confusion by the part of the individual is at a

maximum. The perceived budget constraint in this case is
cij  yij ,

where

yïj  mij 


1
 gc   g j  .
N
j


The budget line becomes horizontal, and equilibrium is reached at a point of tangency
with the corresponding indifference curve where both the marginal rate of substitution
is zero and the resource constraint is satisfied. The level of provision of the regional
public good, g sj  fi  , satisfies then the condition



N j H g g j

s fi 

  0,

j,

and g sj  fi   g sj . Individuals internalize the benefits of the regional public good, but
erroneously perceive that it has a zero tax-price.
This is obviously an extreme and unlikely occurrence, which should make us reflect
on the nature of the fiscal illusion assumption. This result would lead to a large demand
of the public good but, and this is important to note, also to a too small, perhaps
unsustainable amount of private consumption.21 The illusion-distorted marginal tax
price is the signal that compels the consumer to demand that much public good, but the
opposite effect on private consumption caused by the scarcity of resources is a reminder
to the same consumer that something may be wrong with his perception as to what is
the true tax-price of the public good. Fiscal illusion may be real enough in situations in
which economic agents have to deal with several interrelated government levels, but
this argument suggests that it must necessarily be a local phenomenon. Fiscal illusion

inability to distinguish the use of taxes when the taxing government uses more than one tax and is, in
some sense, more removed from the taxpayer than the regional government. See also Courant, Gramlich
and Rubinfeld (1979). They use the same definition of fiscal illusion as Oates, but take into account the
funding of the central government transfer.
21

In a more general model it could also lead to a sub optimal consumption of the national public good:
See Logan (1986).
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cannot persist for large changes; it must correct itself as the consequences of large
changes are born by the consumer.22

6.2. The empirical relevance of “fiscal illusion”: some illustrative calculations
Figure 4 shows the effect of fiscal illusion in the tax/transfer mix scenario. In this
case, equilibrium with fiscal illusion is at point B , with a larger level of provision of
the public good than would be the case without fiscal illusion.
The increase in the public good depends on the elasticity of demand for the public
good with respect to social marginal cost. Let us suppose for simplicity that this
elasticity is constant over the relevant range and equal to  gc , then the relative change in
the level of provision of the public good, dg j g j , is

dg j
gj



dMC
 gc .
MC

On the other hand, from (14) and (18)

 Nj N
dMC

.
MC
1   1   N j N  
Therefore,
dg j
gj



 Nj N

1   1   N j N  

 gc .

(19)

The fraction on the right hand side of (19) is positive  0 :1 and increasing in coverage
factor and region size. Thus, since  gc  0 , dg j g j  0 .

Figure 4: The effect of fiscal illusion

22

See also that in this argument, the general equilibrium nature of the model plays an important role. We
are essentially dealing with substitution effects. Income effects, when present, are very small. Thus, when
testing empirically the presence of fiscal illusion, demand responses should be estimated holding real
income constant.
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What we want to ascertain is whether the responsiveness of public expenditure with
respect to transfers increases with fiscal illusion. In our model, an increase in 
measures by definition a substitution of transfers for own regional taxes. Without fiscal
illusion, the elasticity of public expenditure with respect to  ,  g , is

 g  

 1   N j N  
 gc .
1   1   N j N  

(20)

Whereas with fiscal illusion, this elasticity is

 gfi  


1 

 gc .

(21)

Therefore, the differential response of public good provision on transfer increase due to
fiscal illusion is

 gfi   g  

or, using (19),

 Nj N

1    1   1   N j



N  

 gc ,

(22)
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1 dg j
.
1  g j

Table 1 presents, in percentage terms, values for expressions (20), (21) and (22) for
an assumed demand elasticity of -0.5 and different values of  and N j N .

Table 2: The effect of fiscal illusion

 gc  0.5
Nj N



0.05

0.10

0.20

 g
0.3

0.20

0.18

0.16

0.5

0.45

0.41

0.33

0.7

0.99

0.85

0.64

 gfi
0.3

0.21

0.21

0.21

0.5

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.7

1.17

1.17

1.17

 gfi   g : Differential effect
0.3

0.01

0.03

0.06

0.5

0.05

0.09

0.17

0.7

0.17

0.32

0.53

These are illustrative calculations, but fall within the range of empirically estimated
effects (Fisher, 1982), particularly if we take into account that they refer, as we believe
it should be, to resource compensated effects. From the second panel, it is clear that the
existence of fiscal illusion generates a demand response that increases with the size of
the transfer but is unaffected by region size. This is a potentially testable hypothesis to
ascertain the existence of fiscal illusion since, as can be observed in the first panel,
without fiscal illusion the demand response, although it also increases with respect to
transfer size, it decreases with the size of the region. Indeed, this is precisely what
expressions (20) and (21) suggest: a) Without fiscal illusion, the responsiveness of
demand for the regional public good with respect to transfers depends on both the
fraction that the transfer represents of total public expenditure and the relative size of
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the region. And b) with fiscal illusion, the responsiveness of demand for the regional
public good with respect to transfers depends only on the fraction that the transfer
represents of total public expenditure.
In the context of our model, we can also be more precise as to the relationship
between transfer elasticity, region and transfer size. Figure 5, which is based on
expression (20), shows how, holding constant the relative size of the region, the
elasticity without fiscal illusion increases very slowly if the transfer is relatively small,
but very fast as the transfer becomes larger and larger. Also, for a given coverage
fraction of the transfer, the larger is the region the smaller should the elasticity be. In
short, without money illusion these two variables ― region and transfer size ― interact
with each other in a multiplicative fashion. This is again a testable proposition.

Elasticity without fiscal illusion

Figure 5: The influence of transfer and region size on elasticity
10
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6.3. Fiscal illusion and the tax/exogenous transfer mix scenario
For the same reasons discussed with respect to the own regional tax scenario, the
mix scenario with an exogenous transfer complemented with a regional tax, considered
in Section 4, is not compatible with money illusion. In that scenario the transfer exerts a
mere income effect. Therefore, confusing the destination of the two taxes paid by the
individual to the central government has no effect on the tax price of the public good.
The equilibrium with fiscal illusion is the same as that without fiscal illusion discussed
above.
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Things would be different, of course, if the definition of fiscal illusion given above
in Section 6.1 was enlarged to include, not only the failure by the part of the individual
to distinguish between the two taxes paid to the central government, but also the
mistaken perception of considering the exogenous transfer linked to the provision of the
regional public good. But this would lead us to an analysis identical to the case
considered in Section 6.2, and at the cost of lowering significantly the explanatory
power of our definition of fiscal illusion. We thus prefer to leave this definition free of
additional elements that belong more properly to the institutional setting of the system
of finance than to the sphere of individual perceptions.

7. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to evaluate in terms of efficiency the most
relevant finance scenarios open to regional governments. In particular, we have
considered the following alternative forms of regional finance: own regional taxes;
transfers from the central government; and transfers complemented with own regional
taxes.
The model used to evaluate these different scenarios is based on individual demand
decisions concerning the level of the regional public good, where individuals have
identical quasi-linear preferences defined over private consumption and the regional
public good, and where only endowment income varies between individuals and
regions. This is admittedly a very simple model, but we show that it is sufficient to
discriminate between the efficiency properties of the different scenarios considered.
The equilibrium level of provision coincides with the Pareto efficient equilibrium in
the case of own regional tax finance, but there is over provision if there is a transfer
from the central government that is a given fraction of the cost of the demanded public
good. We show that the degree of over provision increases as the coverage fraction of
the transfer increases. If, on the other hand, the transfer is independent of the level of
provision of the public good, efficiency is re-established providing that this transfer is
marginally complemented with an own regional tax. Although the basic model from
which these results are obtained assumes non distortionary taxation, we argue in the
Appendix that these results are likely to hold also in a situation in which taxes have
efficiency costs.
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We use this model to define formally the concept of fiscal illusion as the failure by

the part of the individual to distinguish between the different taxes he pays the central
government, and therefore the different types of expenditure they finance. We show that
the own regional tax scenario is not compatible with fiscal illusion as defined here,
whereas the tax/transfer scenario yields a higher demand for the public good with than
without fiscal illusion. The model suggests two hypotheses, both of them potentially
testable, according to which without fiscal illusion, the responsiveness of demand for
the regional public good with respect to transfers depends on the relative size of both
the transfer (in a positive way) and the region (in a negative way), whereas with fiscal
illusion the responsiveness of demand for the regional public good depends only
(positively) on the fraction that the transfer represents of total public expenditure. We
also argue that fiscal illusion must necessarily be a local phenomenon, which is likely to
correct itself when the consumer becomes aware of the global implications (namely, the
cost in terms of lost private consumption) of misperceiving the tax-price of public
goods.
McLure (1983) is right when he reminds us of the differences between theoretical
recommendations and the real world. The distribution of resources between different
levels of government does not take place in a void. There are many historical, political,
geographic and cultural factors that end up playing a significant role in determining the
distribution of tax responsibilities assigned to subcentral governments. The weight of
own taxes in regional governments will not be the same in a country in which
decentralization has proceeded from top to bottom, than in another were the process has
been the other way around. Still, we feel that theoretical analysis, such as the one
developed here, may help us not only to understand the essential elements of the
problem at hand, but also, by enabling us to identify the cost of suboptimal financial
configurations, to gain an idea of the importance that economic agents place on these
other historical and cultural factors.

Annex
A tax/transfer mix model with distortionary income taxation
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How would the results of Section 3 above be altered if we consider distortionary
taxation? The answer is “not much” if, keeping in the line of maximum simplicity
adopted in this article, we abstract from distributional considerations.
Let us suppose that we have an economy of identical individuals, all with the same
level of income y i . They live in J territorial jurisdictions, populated with N j
inhabitants

 j  1,..., J  . That is, we have an economy with

J identical representative

consumers, each living in a jurisdiction of different predetermined size. Taxation
imposes an efficiency cost: the higher the rate of taxation t j is, the lower the level of
individual income will be. This effect is the same for all individuals. Other than these,
all the assumptions used in the main text are maintained here.
We start with equation (9), which given the new assumptions and notation reads:


  yi
yi 
c  y 1    tk f k     1     t j y j ,
y j 
k j

  y
i

i

(A.1)

where t j  g j y j , j , y j  N j y i , f k  yk y , y  Ny i and N   j N j .
Substituting (A.1) into (1), the representative individual’s indirect utility function is


  yi
yi 
W i  y i 1    tk f k     1     t j y j  H  t j y j  ,
y j 
k j

  y

(A.2)

and, assuming no cross tax effects between regions, the first order condition for the tax
rate that maximises welfare

W i
yi  1
1 
 1    k tk f k     1     y j 1     H g y j 1     0.
tj
t j  N
N j 
or,

 Nj
N j H g  g j   1   1 
N




,
  1    k tk f k
t j 1   






where  is the elasticity of personal income with respect to the income tax rate,



 yi t j
,
 t j yi

(A.3)
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which following Dahlby (2008) we assume to hold constant over the relevant range of
analysis. We further assume that   0 and, to ensure that a change in the tax rate
increases revenue, that   1 .
Given these assumptions, to see the difference that distortionary taxation makes
with respect to the optimal allocation, expression (A.3) must be compared with
expression (8). The new term that appears in the first order condition is



 1    k tk f k

t



j

1   

,

which is positive. With distortionary taxation, the sum of marginal benefits has to be



equated to an aggregate marginal cost MC d





that is higher than the one associated to



lump sum taxation MC ls . Other things equal, the more distortionary the tax is, the
larger the difference between MC d and MC ls . Thus, with distortionary taxation, the
level of provision of the public good is lower than the level associated to lump sum
taxation.
Expression (A.3) is the general case, where   0    1 measures the tax/transfer
mix. If   0 , the provision of the regional public goods is financed only with own
regional taxes. In that case, we have from (A.3) that
N j Hg  g j   1



t j 1   

(A.4)

.

This is greater than 1, the value of the aggregate marginal cost with lump sum finance
case ―see expression (6) above. Again, with respect to the lump sum finance case, the
provision of the regional public good is reduced.
Finally, if   1 , the regional public good is financed only with transfers, and the
condition becomes

N j Hg  g j  

Nj
N



 1   k tk f k

t



j 1   

,

(A.5)

which is greater than N j N , the marginal cost with lump sum finance ―see expression
(7) above― and thus yields again a lower level of provision of the regional public good.
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It is easy to show that the marginal cost associated to these three expressions, keeps
the same ordering as that found in the lump sum finance case. In particular, partially
differentiating the right hand side of (A.3) with respect to  we find that the marginal
cost decreases as the transfer represents a higher proportion of total finance:

 Nj 
 MC d

  1 
 0.
   tk f k

N  k j
t j 1   

Therefore, the result that the provision of the public good increases as we substitute
transfers for own regional taxation is maintained with distortionary taxation. In this
case, however, we cannot assert that the all tax equilibrium    0  coincides with the
Pareto efficient equilibrium, as it was the case with lump sum finance.
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